Abstract: A number of technology products display positive network effects, and are used in variable quantities by heterogeneous customers. Examples include operating systems, infrastructure and back-end software, web services and networking equipment. This paper studies optimal nonlinear pricing for such products, under incomplete information, and with the threat of competitivc entry. Both homogeneous and heterogeneous network effects are modeled. Conditions under which a fulfilled-expectatim contract exists and is unique are established. While network effects generally raise price, it is shown that accompanying changes in consumption depend on the nature of the network effects -in some cnscs, it is optimal for the monopolist to induce no changes in usage across customers, while in others cases, network effects raise the usage of all market participants.
Introduction
This paper analyzes technology industries in which products displays positive network effects, and individual consumption varies across heterogeneous customers. The principal goals of the paper are to characterize the optimal nonlinear pricing schedules under incomplete information, and to study the resulting consumption patterns, profits and welfare, for different kinds of network effects, and under the potential threat of competitive entry.
Standard economic theories of products that display network effects (henceforth termed network goods) typically assume that each customer purchases a maximum of one unit of the product, that the value of the network effect is proportionate t,o the total size of the product's eventual user base, and that all customer bencfit cqually from the network effects (Katz and Shapiro, 1985, Farrell and Saloner, 1985) . However, there are a number of technology products which are consumed in variable quantities by different customers, and for which the magnitude of the network effects may depend on the total quantity consumed across customers, rather than simply the total number of adopters. In addition, the value each customer gets from the network effects may depend on their individual consumption, which in turn depends on the intrinsic value they place on the product.
Extending the standard theory to incorporate these observations may have important implications for companies seeking to design optimal pricing policy for their network goods, as well as for the regulatory analysis of industries with network effects.
The relevance of these obseservations can be illustrated through a few common examples of technology products that display network effects. Consider, for instance, the purchase of PC operating systems software by corporate customers. The simplest pricing problem faced by a seller in this market is one of choosing a pricing schedule, where quantity is measured by number of user licenses, and each corporate cktomer purchases a variable quantity of licenses. The network effects are caused largely by the higher availability and quality of complementary goods (applications software, compatible accessories) as the total number of OS installations increases. Consequently, the ma.gnit,llrln of the network effects are proportionate to the total number of licenses sold (the gross consumption), rather than simply the number of corporations who adopt the 0s. Moreover, a corporation which has a higher number of licenses benefits more from the increased quality and availability of the complementary g o o d s in other words, the value realized from the network effects also depends on individual consumption, and may therefore be heterogeneous across corporations2, ' I n addition, there is a positive externality driven by value from intemperability, which is far more important within an organization than acmss companies, and is therefore influenced more by mindindual consumption.
A similar argument can be made for back-end or enterprise software used in variable quantities by different companies (Oracle's datahme software and Siehel's CRM snlr~t.ion being two examples), or for networking equipment like routers and switches. In these cases, network effects are driven by the ease with which one can find qualified support or administration engineers, trained employees, compatible software, or compatible equipment3. Network goods sold directly to individuals consumers may also display the same properties. For example, electronic marketplaces like eBay are widely recognized as displaying positive network effects, which stem from increrised liquidity, as well as a wider availability of robust systems supporting marketplace services (reputation, escrow, payment, settlement, dispute resolution). The magnitude of the network effects increases not just with the number of participants in the market, but with the extent to which each participant actually buys and sells; moreover, an individual who participates more realizes higher benefits from them. Even for products used as canonical examples of network goods, such as telephone service, usage varies across consumers, network effects dependent on total consumption as well as installed base, users with higher consumption levels benefit more from the network effects, and pricing is often nonlinear.
The ubiquity of variable consumption and heterogenous value from network goods in technology industries underlines the importance of a robust theoretical analysis that incorporates these prop erties. This paper providw such an analysis, characterizing the optimal nonlinear pricing schedule for a monopolist selling a network good, in a general model which explicitly captures the properties highlighted in the examples above. Two cases are analyzed successively. First, network effects whose magnitude depends on gross realized consumption (and are homogeneous across customers) are studied. Subsequently, network effects whose magnitude is heterogeneous across customers (by virtue of depending on both gross consumption and individual consumption) are modeled. The changes in consumption induced by the network effects are shown to vary significantly across the cases. There are also interesting variations in the manner in which the value generated by the network effects is distributed across the different customers. Moreover, while there are progressively steeper quantity diwou~lts as i~~dividual c v~~s u~~~p t i v~l i~lcreases in both cases, optimal prici~~g i11 the latter case may involve a two-part tariff.
In addition to pure monopoly pricing, this paper also analyzes pricing by an entry-deterring (Spence, 1977 , Dixit, 1980 . This paper proposes and analyzes an alternate representation, in which to successfully deter a threat of entry, the monopolist must provide each customer with surplus equal to at least the maximum intrinsic value they could get from a competing product. This limits the price each customer pays under the monopolist's nonlinear pricing schedule to being no more than the value they get from the network effects of the monopolist's product. As a consequence, network value may play the role of being the primary source of profits for a monopolist who prices to successfully deter entry. On the face of it, this has promising welfare implications, since one would expect a threat of entry to induce a substantial increase in consumption. Surprisingly, it is shown that there are sometimes no consumption changes (despite price reductions), and that when there are, the consumption increases are confined largely to a lower subset of types. However, entry deterrence is shown to even nut the relative distribution of surplus across different customer types. The second line of research this paper adds to is the literature on price screening in technology markets. Models developed by Mussa and Rosen (1978), Maskin and Riley (1984) and Wilson (1993) have been adapted and applied to problems unique to technology markets, by Nault (1997) The second set of properties characterizes the nature of the network effects -the gross value from the network effects is non-decreasing in gross consumption, and the marginal value from an increase in gross consumption is (weakly) higher at a higher level of individual consumption, and is (weakly) higher for higher types. The source of these network effects are not modeled explicitly.
The model therefore adopts what Economides (1996b) calls the 'macro' approach.
The third set of properties assume decreasing absolute risk aversion (which is frequently used to characterize the relative curvature of the value functions of different customer types), and marginal utility that is concave in type 8 (which is a standard assumption to ensures that the optimal contract separates customer types). In one case, a slightly stronger assumption than decreasing absolute risk aversion -that the concavity of W with respect to q does not increase with type -is necessary5.
The final set of properties simply state that there is a consumption level beyond which the value from additional consumption decreases. It reflects the reality that customers consume a finite quantity of any network good, even if the marginal price of additional consumption is zero (under a site license, for instance). This is because value from usage is typically bounded by a constraint on some related resource -attention or computing power being two common examplesand the implicit presence of a substitute use for this resource. Analogously, sometimes the increased consumption of the product may necessitate the purchase of additional necessary complementary assets (more powerful computer hardware for increased software usage, for i n~t a n c e )~. The quantity that maximizes intrinsic value is denoted a(8) -that is, a (8) ( 8 ) are common knowledge. Notation used most frequently (some of which is defined formally later in the paper) is summarized in Table 2 .1.
Rather than explicitly considering all possible pricing functions, the revelation principle ensures that we can restrict our analysis to direct mechanisms, which specify the pricing schedule as a menu of quantity-price pairs (q(t), r(t)) which are incentive-compatible. A simple exposition of mechanism design, the revelation principle and its applications to pricing can be found in chapter 7 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). In particular, section 7.2 describes the revelation principle, and section 7.1 discusses a non-linear pricing example.
Sequence of events
The interaction between the monopolist and thcir customers is according to the following sequence:
1. The monopolist announces their pricing schedulc as a menu of quantity-price pairs q(t),r(t). 
Customers observe q ( t ) ,~( t ) ,
and form an expectation about what the gross consumption under this pricing schedule will be. All customers have access to the same relevant information7, and are assumed to form the same expectation QE, which is also k n m to the monopolist. If not, the customer does not participate, and purchases zero quantity.
The monopolist gets a payoff of B E 8
where 8 is the set of participating types. Each participating customer gets a payoff of where Q A is the actual realized gross consamption. Each customer that does not participate gets a payoff of ~( 0 ) .
Contracts
This subsection defines the different contracts, all of which are direct mechanisms, that are used in subsequent analysis. To simplify notation, the definition of the following contracts is based on the assumption of full participation -that is, that all customers find it optimal to purchase under the contract, if the direct mechanism specifies a non-negative allocation for their type. In sections 3 and 4, inducing full participation is always optimal for the monopolist. The solution that the monopolist seeks is a optimal fulfilled-expectations contract. The conditions for the existence and possible uniqueness of these contracts are described independently in each subsection.
E n t r y deterrence and participation constraints
The monopolist in the model may face a threat of entry from an entrants, whose product is intrinsically a perfect substitute for the monopolist's product. By virtue of being the incumbent, the monopolist's product generates positive network value for all customers. The entrant's product, on the other hand, is assumed to provide only its intrinsic valve t o the customers. The fixed cost of entry is assumed to be zero.
The purpose of this subsection is to establish that the problem of pricing to deter entry under the threat of costless entry is equivalent to a problem of pricing in the absence of the entry threat, but instead with specific type-dependent individual rationality constraints.
At a gross consumption level Q, the utility of a cust,omer of type 0 who purchases a quantity q of the monopolist's product for a payment p is (W(q, 6, Q) -p), a i d the utility of a custonler of type 0 who purchases a quantity q of the entrant's product for a payment p is (U(q,0) -p). Given a set of prices, and an expectation Q of gross consumption of the monopolist's product, customers choose the product and quantity that maximizes their utility. Customers indifferent between the monopolist's and the entrant's products are assumed to choose the monopolist's product.
A complete characterization of the entry game is not provided. Rather, the analysis focuses on the characteristics of pricing schedules for the monopolist that successfully deter entry. Since the fixed cost of entry is assumed to be zero, these are pricing schedules for the monopolist under which any pricing schedule offered by the entrant results in zero profits for the entrant.
Recall that u(9) = argmaxU(q,O), 9 and that
Suppose the entrant offered the constant pricing scheme p(q) = E , where E is small. Under this pricing scheme, each customer would choose their intrinsic-value maximizing level of consumption a(@, and would realize surplus of (U(a(0), 6) -E ) . If customers of type 0 expected surplus of less than (U(a(0),0) -E ) from the monopolist's product, they would buy the entrant's product, and the entrant would receive non-zero profits. Therefore, in order to deter entry, the monopolist's pricing scheme must provide customers of type 6 with a surplus of at least (U(a(B), 0) -E), for all E > 0.
he analysis would not change if there were multiple identical entrants.
Clearly, this cannot be achieved unless the monopolist's pricing scheme provides customers of type 0 with surplus of at least U(a(0),0). Since U ( a ( 0 ) , 0 ) is the maximum surplus that a customer of type 0 can get from the entrant's product under any pricing scheme, ensuring that customers get this level of surplus is both necessary and sufficient for the monopolist to deter entry.
As a consequence, when the fixed cost of entry is zero, deterring entry simply imposes a lower bound on the surplus each customer type must receive. Analytically, this is identical to the problem of choosing a pricing scheme with type-dependent individual rationality constraints (Jullien, 2000) .
In other words, setting o ( 0 ) = U(a(O),O) in equation (2.7) ensures that any Q-feasible contract deters entry, and the definitions of all the other contracts in section 2.3 remain the same.
When faced with a threat of entry, the monopolist's problem is therefore to choose the optimal fulfilled-expectations contract, with o ( 0 ) = U ( a ( 0 ) , 0). In the following sections, the monopolist's problem is solved both in the absence of an entry threat, as well as in its presence, for both homogeneous and heterogeneous network effects.
Preliminary results
The purpose of this subsection is to present two preliminary results used in the subsequent analysis.
The first result characterizes the optimal contract offered by the monopolist in the absence of network effects -that is, when W ( q , 0 , Q ) = U(q,8) for all Q . This is termed the base m e , and is used as a benchmark in sections 3 and 4. The second result describes the structure of Q-optima1 contracts, and demonstrates their uniqueness.
In the base case, since there are no network effects, fulfilled-expectations do not play a role. This contract defined by (2.13) and (2.14) is unique. Moreover, for all 0 such that qO(0) > 0, it satisfies qY(0) > 0, rf(0) > 0. is unique, and is defined by the following conditions:
and Unless otherwise specified, proofs of all results are available in Appendix A.
Homogeneous network effects
This section analyzes network effects that depend on just gross consumption, and discusses some properties of consumption, pricing and welfare under the optimal fulfilled-expectations contract.
The value function W(q, 8,Q) is assumed to be linearly separable in intrinsic value and network value, and to take the following form
From the definition of intrinsic value U(q,8), (3.1) implies that w(0) = 0.
P u r e monopoly pricing
In the absence of an entry threat (which is referred to as pure monopoly, to distinguish it from the subsequent entry-deterring monopoly), the following proposition establishes that the unique solution to the monopolist's problem is very similar to that of the base case: Proposition 1 shows that when the network value function depends on just gross consumption, the monopolist finds it optimal to induce levels of consumption from each customer type that are identical to those in the absence of network effects, and to simply increase the total price charged to every type by an amount equal to the network value. The intuition behind this result is straightforward. For any common expectation Q of gross consumption, the value functions of all customer types are shifted up by the same constant amount w(Q). Since there is no change in the marginal properties of the utility functions, the monopolist's optimal allocation q8(0) remains the same for all types. This is illustrated in Figure 3 .1. This subsection specifies the optimal fulfilled-expectations contracts in the presence of an entry threat that is successfully deterred. The main result establishes that the unique solution to the monopolist's problem in this case is to specify a quantity-independent (fixed-fee) pricing schedule: Proposition 2 establishes that when network effects depend on just gross consumption, the optimal entry-deterring pricing scheme results in all customers choosing the level of consumption that maximizes total surplusg. Intuitively, a contract that separates any subset of types (in order to pricodiscriminate) would need to induce consumption levels that are strictly lower than a (8) O~ote that since W,(q, 0 , Q) = 0 in this caw, B(0, Q) = a(6). for all but the highest type in this subset. This would result in a strict decrease in profits for the monopolist, since they would have to share some portion of the network value w(Q") with the customers in this subset in order to satisfy [IR] and ensure that customer surplus is at least
U(a(O),O).
The accompanying reduction in Q" accentuates the reduction in monopoly profits further. As a consequence, it is strictly profit-reducing to price-discriminate, and the monopolist offers the fixed-fee that maximizes profits.
Example
An example is analyzed to illustrate the results of Propositions 1 and 2 further, and to cxamine how network effects and the threat of entry changes the surplus distribution across customers.
In order to perform the latter analysis, define the cwtomer surplw function as:
~' ( 0 ) is the surplus that customers of type 0 get under the optimal fulfilled-expectations contract.
Also, define the surplus distribution function sp(0) as:
~~ ( 0 ) measures how is the total customer surplus (that is, the total value not captured by the monopolist) is distributed across the different customer types. It enables one to examine how changes in network effects affect the relative levels of surplus that different customer types get.
The example uses a simple quadratic value function, and uniformly distributed customer types.
The value function is assumed to take the following form:
and customer types are assumed to be uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, which implies that f(0) = 1 and F(0) = 0.
The contracts and surplus values that result from applying Propositions 1 and 2, and equations (3.6) and (3.7) are sumrr~arized in Table 3 .1. Under pure n~onopoly, consister~t with Proposition 1, consumption is unaffected by the network effects, and prices increase by an amount equal to the network value. Under entry deterring monopoly, individual consumption increases for all customers, and a fixed fee equal to the network value is charged to each customer. Under entry-deterring monopoly, prices increase for a subset of lower types. However, so does customer surplus, as indicated in Figure 3 .2 (c). Mhermore, Figure 3 .
(d) shows that when
there is a threat of entry, the relative distribution of surplus across different customer types is less skewed in favor of highcr-usagc customers. This is despite the incrense in total pricc for thc lower-usage customers, relative to the higher-usage customers. These results are discussed further in Section 5.
Heterogeneous network effects
This section models network effects that depend on both gross consumption and individual con- 
Pure monopoly pricing
In the absence of an entry threat, the following proposition establishes the main characteristics of the optimal fulfilled-expectations contracts: Sufficient conditions for the existence of an optimal fulfilled-expectations equilibrium are fairly mild -all that is required is that the marginal benefit from the network effects w ( Q ) be bounded.
The condition for uniqueness requires that in general, marginal network value not grow too fast relative to marginal intrinsic value. However, even if the solution is not unique, this is not unduly troubling, since multiple possible equilibrium outcomes are not uncommon in models of network goods. The monopolist simply needs to pick the optimal fulfilled-expectations contract that provides The network effects shift the customer value functions up by qw(Q*) for all types. Since this shift is proportionate to individual consumption, it results in optimal quantities that are different from those of the base case. Part (c) of the proposition establishes that this is a strict increase for all types, and is illustrated in Figure 4 .1, for two candidate types. Correspondingly, prices also go up for all customers. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 discuss the changes in the division of total surplus further.
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Entry deterring monopoly pricing
The analysis of Proposition 3 is now extended to the case where a threat of entry is successfully deterred. Some new notation is introduced (though mostly in the proof of Proposition 4, which is in the appendix).
Let qm(8,Q) denote the Q-optimal contract under pure monopoly. Applying Lemma 2 , this -"FLeeall that customer expectations are formed after the contract is specified.
allocation is defined for each O by the necessary conditions and is unique for a fixed value of Q. Also, from Proposition 3, we know that there is an optimal fulfilled-expectations equilibrium -that is, there is a value of gross consumption such that
The following proposition establishes that the monopolist's pricing scheme results in individual consumption that is either of the form qm(O, Q ) , or that maximizes intrinsic value for the customer: Proposition 4 establishes that the same conditions that ensure uniqueness of the optimal fulfilledexpectations contract in the absence of an entry threat are sufficient to ensure uniqueness under the threat of entry. It also establishes that the optimal fulfilled-expectations contract that deters entry can be elegantly characterized using a combination of Q-optimal contracts under pure monopoly, and the contract that implements allocations of a (8) Under the conditions of part (b) of the proposition, there are substantial changes in individual consumption (relative to pure monopoly). However, 6(Q") is always an interior point of [6J,8] . This implies that the larger increases in individual consumption (to the level a(0) which maximizes intrinsic value) will always be for a subset of 'lower' types, and that there will always be a subset of higher types whose individual consumption is still of the form qm(B,Q*). It is easily shown that under part (b) of the proposition, Q* > Qm, which implies that consumption increases for all customer types (but more substantially for the lower subset).
Welfare analysis
This subsection characterizes how the monopolist and its customers share the surplus generated by the network effects under pure monopoly, and also discusses surplus division under entry-deterring monopoly.
Suppose qa (8) , ~' ( 8 ) is an optimal fulfilled-expectations contract for some value function W(q, 9, Q), Under entry-deterring monopoly, the division of direct and indirect increa-in surplus is less relevant -all customers of type 8 get surplus at least equal to U ( a ( 8 ) , 8 ) , which implies that they capture all of the intrinsic value that they create. Moreover, the customer types whose optimal consumption is of the form qm(8, p) (that is, all customers under part (a), and the higher subset under part (b) of Proposition 4) capture a fraction of the network value that they create. Since U(a(B),B) , which implies that these customers are capturing a fraction over and above this reservation level. The optimal pricing function is therefore a nonlinear two-part taviff, with a fixed component that increases with the marginal network value w , and a strictly concave variable portion -again, implying a quantity discount that is progressively increasing. Moreover, differentiating (4.20) with respect to q indicates that pl.(q) = & -z, which is strictly increasing in w for w < 1. As a consequence, absolute prices at any level of consumption always increase with w .
As shown in Figure 4 .2 (c), an increase in w increases customer surplus for all customer types.
What is particularly interesting is that as w increases, the relative distribution of surplus across customer types is less convex. This is illustrated in Figure 4 .2 (d), and indicates that at higher levels of network effects, surplus is distributed more evenly across customers of different types. This is a socially favorable result, because it suggests higher distributional equity of the value created, Illustrates the optimal fulfilled-expectation contracts and corresponding customer surplus and relative surplus for purr monopoly, in the example when network effects are heterogeneous across types. In each figure, the dotted curve represents the base case (when network value is zero).
across customers who differ in their usage levels.
Under entry-deterring monopoly, equating the expressions for Qa and Qm indicate that part (a) of Proposition is applicable for w 2 4, and part (b) applies for w 5 4. This confirms that the entry threat induces changes in total surplus (via an induced change in optimal consumption) for lower levels of network effects, but not at higher levels.
As illustrated in Figure 4 .3 (a), as w increases, optimal consumption is raised (relative to the corresponding levels under pure monopoly) for an increasingly smaller fraction of customer types, and when w 2 4, consumption is unaltered for all types (though total prices reduce by a fixed amount across all types).
At fairly low values of w, total price may increase for a subset of lower types. This is because 
(d).
The former effect is more pronounced when network effects are lower. This is not surprising, since the latter effect is more pronounced when network effects are higher (and as a consequence, there is already less inequity across customers to begin with). This result has interesting policy implications, which are discussed further in Section 5.
Discussion
A number of new results relating to the pricing of network goods have been derived in Sections 3 and 4. This section discusses some of these results, examines some of the model's assumptions, and concludes with an outline of open questions raised by the analysis.
Discussion of results
Managers in technology industries with network effects face especially difficult pricing problems.
Their challenges include setting complex pricing schedules for variable quantity purchases, designing optimal quantity discounts, taking into account hcterogeneity in network value across different customers, and also incorporating the reality that entry threats and 'comparables' from potential competitors play an important role in limiting the amount customers can be charged. Network effects pose an additional unique challenge, since there is the trade-off between designing prices that increase value from higher gross consumption, and prices that enables the seller to capture as much of this value as possible.
This paper provide a set of theoretical results, based on a model which explicitly captures these issues, and can therefore form a robust basis for designing pricing policy for products of this kind. In addition, many empirical papers on network externalities (for instance, Gandal, 1995 , Brynjolfsson and Kemerer, 1996 , Forman, 2001 ) have studied technology markets -databases, spreadsheets, networking equipment -in which sellers with monopoly power routinely offer nonlinear pricing schedules, sell variable quantities to customers, and price to deter entry. The results of this paper could form a stronger theory base for Future empirical work which aims to estimate the extent and implications of network effects in such markets.
When network effects do not vary across customers: Proposition 1 establishes that an increase in network effects induces no change in consumption, and that all surplus From the network effects is appropriated by the monopolist. A threat of entry changes pricing substantially -a fixed fee is offered to all customer types, and the outcome is socially optimal. While the specification of network effects in section 3 is simple, it would apply to industries in which the primary network value stems from a common fixed-cost reduction -for instance, the cost of finding the appropriate hosting infrastructure, or qualified technical support. These results also indicate that if competing products are anything but perfectly compatible, any oligopoly outcome will be socially inferior to the entry-deterring monopoly outcome. In other words, from a policy perspective, ensuring a credible t h m t of entry is more socially eficient than actually inducing entry.
When the value realized from network effects varies with individual consumption, Proposition 3 establishes a strict increase in individual consumption across all customer types. In any model of nonlinear pricing, there is always a trade-off between value creation and price discrimination, and the consumption of lower customer types is limited by the monopolist' desire to capture as much surplus as possible. The issue of value creation is accentrlated further when there are network effects, since increases in consumption from any subset of customer types increases the value created by all ci~stomer types. The trade-off still exists, though, and while pricing is redesigned to induce usage increases from both lower and higher customer types, the lower-usage customers still consume at a socially inefficient level. However, the relative distribution of surplus improves for lower custo~ner types, implying that the network effects benefit lower-usage customers disproportionately, even though the higher-usage customers contribute relatively more to their actual magnitude.
Furthermore, when network value depends on individual consumption as well as gross consumption, the effects of an entry threat are less pronounced that those established by Proposition 2. In fact, as shown in Proposition 4(a), the threat of entry may have no effect on consumption or surplus, and may merely result in a price change that redistributes surplus between the monopolist and its customers. Note that this occurs even when entry is not blockaded. This outcome is most likely when, relative to marginal intrinsic value, marginal network value is fairly high across all customers, as illustrated further by the example in Section 4.4.
The examples studied in sections 3.3 and 4.4 are particularly instructive in the pricing schedules they prescribe for the seller. Quantity discounts are always optimal, and heterogeneous network effects lead to the optimality of a two-part nonlinear pricing schedule. Many IT products have high fixed costs, and optimal price discrimination is crucial for innovative product lines to be viablc, even for a seller with substantial market power. These results provide important pricing policy guidelines for IT companies that face these tariff design challenges.
These examples also highlight the effect of network effects and entry deterrence on the relative distribution of surplus across participating customers. Regulatory agencies often consider implementing policy that affects not just total surplus, but the equity of surplus distribution across customers. For instance, the attention received by the issue of the 'digital divide' illustrates this potential objective clearly. Towards this end, this paper establishes that even if creating a credible threat of entry does not increase total surplus, it will reduce the inequity in surplus division across the different customers who generate the surplus through their consumption. In addition, there will always be accompanying transfer of surplus to all customers. While the outcome never maximizes total surplus, it is still likely that it is more efficient than an oligopoly with incompatible products.
Discussion of assumptions
The sequence of events specified in section 2.3 assumes that all customers have identical expectations of gross consumption. Under the assumption of rational participants, this is not restrictiveeveryone has access to all the information needed to compute the expected consumption, and once the monopolist has specified prices, there is no residual uncertainty about demand. Clearly, in equilibrium, all customers must have the same expectation (the correct one)
However, compared to standard models of nonlinear pricing, this paper places a higher computational burden on customers. Each customer has to know F(B), compute the optimal consumption (not just for the~nselw, but for all customer types), and them calculate the gross consumption. It may be likely that customers of network goods cannot actually compute the true gross consumption immediately, due to a lack of information, or due to bounds on information processing capability.
There may be a multi-period adjustment process, in which customers iteratively make a series of guesses which converge to the fulfilled-expectations equilibrium outcome. Alternately, customers may learn the distribution of types from the pricing schedule. Formalizing these notions remains (very early-stage) work in progress.
The assumption that W(q,B,Q) has a finite maximum q for all 0 and Q is non-standard.
However, given that marginal costs are zero in the model, it is necessary in order to get a bounded solution. It is also a reflection of reality -that customers do stop using zero marginal price products at a finite level, typically due to the presence of resource constraints, and substitute uses for shared resources, as discussed in Section 2.1.
In addition, slightly modified versions of all of the results in this paper continue to hold under the assumption of unbounded value functions and positivc convcx costs. Consider, for instance, a (standard) specification in which customer utility is ~( q , 0, Q), *(q, 0,Q) > 0 for all q (and w(rg,B, Q) has the other curvature properties attributed to the customer value function in this paper). In addition, suppose the provision of quantity q to each customer has a positive cost c(q), where cl(q) > 0, cI1(q) > 0. If one defined the total surplus function as:
then W(q, 9,Q) would have the same properties as it does in this model. More importantly, all the expressions for q*(8) derived in the model would continue to be valid, and so would all the expressions for ~' ( 8 )~ if it is treated as the optimal markup rather than the optimal price. In other words, the optimal contracts would be qW (8) , (~' ( 8 ) + c(qf(8))), with the same expressions for q' (8) and ~~ ( 9 ) as derived in sections 3 and 4. Therefore, this paper's results are also applicable for technology products that display positive network effects, but which have non-zero marginal costs (networking equipment or handheld computers, for instance)
Some of the paper's results have specified conditions on the marginal network value that are necessary to guarantee uniqueness. However, none of the properties of the contracts derived in Propositions 1 through 3 depend on uniqueness, and neither do the results of Proposition 5. If there are multiple optimal fulfilled-expectations equilibria, all the monopolist needs to do is choose the one with the highest profits. Proposition 4 relies on uniqueness, though a slightly modified version holds if one assumes that the monopolist always chooses the highest-profit contract.
Concluding remarks
The value from network effects in this model vary wross types due to the customers' varying individual consumption needs. As formulated, the model does not yet admit differing network value across different types at the same level of individual consumption. A model that incorporates this is work-in-progress. Early results suggest that for sufficiently heterogeneous marginal network value, network effects may harm low-usage customers. Related work-in-progress involves a setup where network value is of the form wF(Q) + qwY(Q).
A more general characterization might be to model the network good as a multiproduct bundle, and characterize customers using a twwdimensional type vector, drawing on Armstrong (1996) and Rachet and Chone (1998). This would require substantial further analysis, and represents an interesting direction for future research.
Industries in which products display network effects are often natural monopolies, especially when competing products are incompatible and marginal costs are near-zero. Moreover, entrydeterrence appears to play a significant role in practice (as illustrated by the Microsoft antitrust case). The analysis of entry-deterring monopoly is therefore likely to be very important for these industries. In light of the results obtained in this paper, a natural (and open) question that arises is how non-zero entry costs affects outcomes. Clearly, monopoly profits will increase, and entry deterrence will still be an optimal strategy -however, it is likely that profits will increase by less than the entry cost.
Finally, the analysis of entry dctcrrence suggests the feasibility of solving a general model of nonlinear pricing for competing network goods. If customers expect the competing products to have different levels of gross consumption, they would view them as vertically differentiated products, as in Stole (1995), which would admit pricing other than the zero-markup contracts in Mandy (1992).
Similar issues have been analyzed in a model of coalition formation by Economides and Flyer (1998).
Price reductions that increase network effects would become 'quality' investments, 'and the issue of how competitive intensity is affected by these investments, as highlighted by Banker, Khosla and Sinha (1998), becomes relevant, especially since Section 4.2 suggests that in a general model, the equilibrium profits of the smaller network are likely to be zero. Recent results from Rochet and Stole (2001) indicate the feasibility of modeling mixed-strategy equilibria, and I hope to address some of these questions in the near future.
